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BETWEEN MONEY AND SOVEREIGNTY: IS A NEW 




Abstract: The diffusion of alternative financial and credit circuits, in which the money 
favours the self-management of social wealth, may curb the expropriation caused by 
processes of abnormal indebtedness that increasingly characterise economic systems. 
The article proposes an examination of four experiences with complementary currencies that 
have sprung up in Europe after the recent crisis, distinguishing between local currencies 
(Sardex, SoNantes and Sol Violette) and crypto coins (Bitcoin). The possibility of taking 
advantage of the monetary know-how that animates various experiences (like crypto coins and 
local clearing houses) would contribute to the re-thinking money as a social institution. 
Three main topics are discussed: 1. the “political technologies” in which the alternative 
monetary circuits consist; 2. democratic participation in the decision-making processes that 
characterise them; and 3. the meaning of the sovereignties that they potentially define. 
 









It is not an easy task to formulate a definition of money since it is a complex entity, 
an institutional structure that can perform more than one function. This, for example, 
is how Bianchi presents this fact: 
 
By money we mean everything that is generally accepted as means of payment for 
goods and services and as an instrument of the debt repayment. […] It may seem 
paradoxical, but because money performs more than one function and since there is 
no consensus among economists on the pre-eminence of one function or other (or all 
of them), there is therefore no consensus on the univocal definition of monetary 
aggregates, even restricted to a very definite historically institutional situation. 
Different approaches to the role of money in the system bring about different 
specifications of the various goods and financial activities that constitute the monetary 
aggregate (Bianchi 1982, 91–92). 
 
In other words, money is anything that is widely used in transactions to exchange value, but it 
functions not only as a medium of exchange or a unit of account, but also as a store of value. 
This open-mindedness, however, is not common among economists, who rather tend 
to establish a particular definition of money, conceived simply as means of exchange. 
In other words, its characteristics would be theoretically restricted exclusively to 
its transactional function. As John Maynard Keynes stressed, men should intend money as 
a mere intermediary. The problem is that money is actually managed as wealth to store.  
 
It is not easy, it seems, for men to apprehend that their money is a mere intermediary, 
without significance in itself, which flows from one hand to another, is received and 
is dispensed, and disappears when its work is done from the sum of a nation’s wealth 
(Keynes 1923, 124). 
 
Mainstream economists that regard money in its mechanical and often simplified sense 
(as in the neo-classical model) neglect de facto that money may be used as store of value for 
a very long time.  
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In the history of capitalism, deep financial crises give rise to a situation in which 
money is not spent and debts are not paid. When uncertainty prevails, money is sought after 
and withheld to the preference of all else. It is not merely a change in the behaviour of 
economic agents, it depends rather on a peculiar form of monetary institutions: in capitalism 
money is established as a store of value. Economic historians teach us that unlike the other 
two functions of money (as unit of account and means of payment), the store of value is not 
a permanent and general feature of all monetary systems, but a distinctive feature of 
capitalism (Amato and Fantacci 2012a).  
In the face of economic crisis, numerous attempts have been made to reconsider and 
institute alternative monetary circuits, whether as local clearing houses, crypto-coins, vouchers or 
assets intended to be spent in specific local areas and that sometimes are guaranteed by 
sovereign entities, like Local Councils.1 This, undoubtedly, is a vital signal for those who hold 
dear the possibility of constructing forms of socialisation that do not legitimise 
the exploitation of one person by another, but rather promote models of cooperation and 
a valorisation of resources that satisfy notably collective needs. 
 The purpose of my essay is to illustrate the intellectual endeavour that has engaged 
me for a long time now and which I have developed as part of a European project,2 i.e. the 
possibility of taking advantage of the monetary know-how that animates various experiments 
(like crypto coins and local clearing houses) by evaluating the particular ability to create 
a synthesis that would contribute to re-thinking money as a social institution. 
 The diffusion of alternative financial and credit circuits, in which the money favours 
the self-management of social wealth, may in fact curb a perverse mechanism, namely: 
the expropriation caused by processes of abnormal indebtedness that increasingly 
characterises our economic systems. 
 Therefore, first of all, I conduct a close examination of the main experiments with 
complementary currencies that sprung up in Europe after the recent crisis, making sure 
to distinguish between local currencies and crypto coins. I address some problematic issues 
characteristic of the cases studies I present below. These issues concern three main topics: 
                                               
1 A nimble introductory reading is the book by Lietaer and Kennedy (2012). 
2 http://dcentproject.eu/. A project aimed at creating instruments that would favour decision-making 
processes done by, and the political and social participation of, European citizens. D-CENT was based on 
a bottom-up approach that enhances the development of  long-lasting strategies that enable the management of  
goods and services as commons. One of  the instruments developed by D-CENT is a set of  digital social 
currencies that can be used in various contexts, but that use the same technologies. 
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1. the “political technologies” in which the alternative monetary circuits consist;  
2. democratic participation in the decision-making processes that characterise these 
technologies;  
3. the meaning of the sovereignties that they potentially define.  
 
Some questions born of that reflection deserve to be addressed immediately, although I will 
not be able to answer them thoroughly:3 as sub-sovereign entities, are complementary 
currencies destined to remain merely a form of monetary resistance to official monetary 
circuits? In other words, can they be interpreted just as a defection or exodus mechanism 
from the present situation, to use an interesting expression by Christian Marazzi?4 And, if so, 
what kind of defection are we talking about? Starting from these experiments, 
can we redefine the concept of monetary sovereignty and that of state sovereignty? And, 
if so, in view of what? How can we prevent complementary currencies from gradual 
becoming forms of naive or strongly identitarian localism?5 
 
On complementary currency: some case studies 
 
Some different monetary forms that are complementary to official currencies have recently 
emerged in Europe in response to the impact of the current financial crisis in the credit 
system. They have been variously labelled as social, local, alternative monies. However, 
the meaning of these currencies remains to be discussed. On the one hand, the new monies 
have been promoted as innovative tools for socio-territorial policies, with a focus on localist, 
anti-globalist or anti-capitalistic values. On the other hand, the emphasis on the value of 
monies as instruments of alternative territorial development runs the risk of overshadowing 
issues concerning the specific features of currency projects. What is needed is a more 
                                               
3 The issues in question emerged mainly during the Convegno sulla Moneta del Comune (Conference 
on the Common Currency) held in Macao on the 21–22/06/2014 in the lectures of  Christian Marazzi and 
Carlo Vercellone: http://quaderni.sanprecario.info/tag/convegno-moneta-del-comune/. 
4 Marazzi here uses a concept introduced by Paolo Virno, who summarises exodus as follows: “I use 
the term exodus here to define mass defection from state, the alliance between general intellect and political 
action, and a movement toward the public sphere of  intellect” (Virno 1996). 
5 Identitarian localism in particular may develop into racism and discrimination.  
Praktyka Teoretyczna 1(27)/2018 
 
230 
accurate reflection on the institutional implications of different types of currencies, 
in particular concerning the liability of those who hold them to earn or pay an interest. 
In times of crisis, money creation itself can turn out to be a trap, which literally leads to a war 
for liquidity. As Fantacci (2016) maintains: 
 
This “competitive struggle for liquidity” provides a crude picture of what we now call 
the “liquidity trap”: a situation in which money hoarding proceeds unrestrained, and 
conventional monetary policies are incapable of reversing or even arresting it. 
Any injection of liquidity is immediately drained by the unquenchable thirst of 
individuals and governments, without appreciable expansionary effects on 
expenditure, prices, or production. Consumption and investment are postponed, 
as long as there is an expectation of a further fall in prices. However much money 
may be put into circulation, it immediately stops circulating: it is neither spent nor 
invested, but merely hoarded (Fantacci 2016, 5–6).  
 
Facing this credit crunch we have witnessed extremely interesting experiments that given rise to 
alternative monetary circuits able to embed locally. The most famous model is the Wir circuit 
(Studer 2006 [1998]) that was created in Switzerland in 1934 and whose goal was to limit 
the effects of the Great Depression on small and medium-sized enterprises. It is a system of 
exchange between companies – therefore a B2B (business to business) model – 
that encourages transfers between production and commercial units through the multilateral 
compensation of debts and credits. This mechanism enables liquidity management 
streamlining. The production units may obtain a positive compensation6 immediately, as soon 
as they sell the goods or services to other circuit participants. Thus they acquire a Wir credit, 
which serves as means of payment. This circuit allows companies with a production surplus 
to make contact with other companies in need of their resources. This is how 
the transactional network works (fig. 1). The central office – which acts as a clearing house – 
establishes the credit limits for each company.  
Since 1936, the Wir circuit has been a bank under Swiss law, despite the fact that its 
emissions are neither guaranteed nor convertible into money as legal tender, that is Swiss 
                                               
6 “All participants sign up for a membership and start with a balance of  zero WIR-franc in their current 
account. They can start to sell goods or services to another member of  the WIR network and receive WIR-
Francs in return. The buyer’s bank account is debited and the seller’s bank account is simultaneously credited 
by the same amount.” See http://community-currency.info/en/currencies/wir-bank/ 
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francs. Since 1999, Wir Bank has also starting offering, in addition to Wir currency, banking 
services in Swiss francs. Since 2000, these are also available for individuals, not only small and 
medium enterprises. Wir operates as a cooperative. The prices of all goods and services are 
expressed in “Wir credits”. The employment of this circuit follows a trend that, compared to 
the Swiss economy flow, turns out to be counter-cyclical: when the circulation of franc slows 
down (for example due to an economic crisis), Wir circulation grows. This results, in this 
case, in the fact that the complementary currency contributes to economic stability.7 
  
Fig. 1. A circuit B2B 
 
 
Source: www.sardex.net (January 2013) 
[Roberto, the stationer; Antonio, the hotel keeper; Giovanni, the butcher] 
 
 
On this model a recent experience has been built and diffused in a place historically 
characterised by credit crunches and by the utmost radical uncertainty: Sardinia. The crisis 
that broke out in 2007 constitutes the context of the Sardex.net circuit creation. Having 
studied the WIR case, the Sardex.net’s promoters sought to implement the arguments of 
Proudhon and Gesell (Gesell 1958 [1916])8 about the role of money and credit, trying to 
activate a tool that would put into practice that theoretical system. In 2009, after six months 
                                               
7 The financial management of  WIR Bank is extremely balanced and could be adopted by our cooperative 
credit banks as well, without questioning the principles from which they derive their raison d’être. As Giancarlo 
Beltrame demonstrates in his insightful study: “The commissional income deriving from the management of  
the WIR circuit turns out to play a double role in supporting revenue generation: countercyclical to compensate 
for the drop in interest rate differential, but also, and more importantly, structural because the commissional 
component of  the WIR circuit proves to be the most stable in the construction of  the intermediation margin 
and has been able to settle at a contribution level which is decisive for the characteristic net profitability of  
WIR Bank” (Beltrame 2014, 91). 
8 See also what John Maynard Keynes writes about Gesell in chapter 23 of  General Theory (Keynes 1936). 
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of preliminary meetings with the regional companies, especially in the area of Cagliari, whose 
purpose was to form a critical mass, the circuit came to life. The objectives pursued by 
the Sardex.net network are to strengthen communities, increase prosperity and stimulate 
spending in the Sardinia region. As Sartori clearly shows: 
  
Sardex entails the creation of ties among actors that did not know each other before, 
leveraging or filling the void of the lack of a pre-existing rich relational network. 
The cultural and social embeddedness of economic action also appears clearly in 
a context of low levels of social capital with the fostering of a favourable context for 
market exchange and community building. Sardex is an integrated network of 
economic and social ties where a good balance of self-interested and cooperative 
actions has been reached (Sartori 2016, 11). 
 
The regulation of trade takes place between circuit members and through the use of Sardex 
credits. Its exchange ratio to Euro is 1:1. Upon registration each member becomes the holder 
of the bank account and gets a credit line at a zero per cent interest and a purchasing card 
that works within the circuit. The website allows all the members to create a profile that may 
be used to communicate all information about their business, like their products’ 
descriptions, or to search for other registered companies and then carry out 
all the transactions agreed between the parties. The most relevant relations, however, are 
those offline. Each company has the possibility to consult with a broker who offers advice and 
helps to manage transactions in Sardex. The broker tries to facilitate exchanges between 
companies by analysing the debt and credit positions in the circuit: growth in the number of 
transactions must go hand in hand with maintaining a regular level of circulating credit. 
In point of fact, the idea is to maintain a stable money supply per capita, able to sustain the 
volume and number of transactions. Credit lines are provided with a collateral consisting in 
a set of goods made available by the company that joins the circuit. We can imagine 
the collateral as the “warehouse” of the company. Just as in the case of the WIR circuit, risk 
management becomes risk-sharing. However, if the debt position is not hedged within twelve 
months by the sale of the new goods and therefore the attainment of sufficient credits, it has 
to be hedged in Euro. If such an event does not occur, the regular credit recovery procedure 
is launched. These are obviously extreme cases, which have always been avoided thanks to 
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the workings of the Sardex.net commercial area: in fact, advisors oversee the circuit’s acquiring 
of potential buyers of products by an endangered company. 
 Moreover, risk management also provides for hedging debt positions ex post; such 
debt is divided among all the members of the circuit and is to be seen as a kind of 
a “solidarity tax”.9 
 Sardex credits lose value at the same pace as the euro: this inflation is already a kind 
of negative interest that weighs on the currency. Therefore, contrary to the claims of that 
monetary crank Silvio Gesell, Sardex does not add a further negative interest to surplus 
positions. 
 It is a matter here of a local credit circuit, one that is business-oriented and aware of 
the relevance of local demand. For this reason, in June 2012 Sardex launched a business to 
employee (B2E) pilot project that in fact entails the possibility of creating a diversion in the 
liquidity flow, which may harbinger the multiplicative effects on consumption demand that 
characterizes the circuit (according to fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. A circuit B2B + B2E 
 
[imprese – companies; lavoratori salariati – waged workers] 
 
The project involved ten companies in the Cagliari zone. According to its principles, salaries 
are paid partly in Sardex credits. The employees of the companies can voluntarily join 
the Sardex.net circuit and create their own personal accounts, on which they would receive 
part of the salary, bonuses, wage advances or reimbursements. For example: if an employee 
needs an advance for an unexpected expense, he or she can make use of the Sardex.net 
                                               
9 However, it should be emphasised that the credit lines are small: the quotes vary from minimum 1000 to 
maximum 20000 credits. On this subject see Mellone’s (2013) arguments. 
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circuit and thus avoid drawing from savings or turning to other financial institutions that 
would demand high interest. An employer who pays in advance with the Sardex credits will 
obtain benefits in terms of monetary savings in the following months. The system thus also 
benefits, as the Sardex credits received from the employee have to be spent within the local 
circuit. 
83 out of 100 employees involved in the experiment chose to open an account in 
Sardex. The average expense of the employees stood at 500 credits, a conspicuous 
amount. There were employees who spent 100/150 credits and others who received 
nearly their entire salary in these credits (for example those who were renovating their 
houses and found good suppliers within the circuit). The idea is to launch this B2E on 
a larger scale, but in order to do that a network is needed that would guarantee 
a reasonable possibility of spending (an employee cannot be forced to travel 40 km to 
buy something). That network would reflect the network of common currency. 
We are also assembling a capillary spendability in other centers of the province, 
outside of the Cagliari zone. Obviously, in the first phase, which was a B2B 
exclusively, it was not necessary. We are completing the technical tools for the next 
phase, which will consist in accommodating individual consumers in the circuit. 
The consumers will guarantee the companies their most precious asset: their loyalty 
and purchasing power. By choosing to buy within the circuit, they will receive a top-
up of their commercial credits.10 
 
In its first year, 237 businesses traded just over €300,000 in Sardex. In 2017, more than 3,500 
businesses and 2,000 individuals had exchanged 140 million worth of transactions. 
Today Sardex arouses extreme interest in the business world. According to various media, 
it is one of the 28 Italian start-ups whose value exceeds one million euro.11 The expansion 
strategy of the circuit aims, firstly, to consolidate the regional Sardinian economy through 
promoting experiments involving public administrations and, secondly, at valorising skills 
developed over time through forms of consultancy to develop the system in other regional 
entities. We thus face the situation where meeting collective social needs still remains in 
the background. All in all, this depends on including the public administration in the circuit. 
                                               
10 Federica Mellone’s interview with Carlo Mancosu, January 2013, in charge of  communications 
in Sardex.net (Mellone 2013, 94–96). 
11 See, for example, the interview with Carlo Mancosu, published in Repubblica.it on 23 June 2014, 
http://www.repubblica.it/next/2014/06/23/news/dalla_sardegna_al_resto_d_italia_sardex_inventa_la_monet
a_complementare_abbiamo_ripensato_l_economia-89771112/. 
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For, by employing multilateral clearing houses, the public administration would be able to 
create greater liquidity in Sardex, which it could then forward to promote its social policies 
in the areas that its manages.  
Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci fostered a project called Libra, the name for a local 
multilateral clearing house able to give voice directly to workers’ associations and to 
the variegated non-profit world, meaning it was not conceived merely as a B2B. Between 
2010 and 2013 in Nantes these two scientists made sure all the conditions were there for the 
realisation of the project. The project consists of a credit circuit and a monetary circuit 
integrated in a unique local financial system. The credit circuit is designed as a clearing house 
meant to support exchanges between companies. Similar to the Sardex case, each company 
belonging to the circuit has a bank account denominated in the local currency (SoNantes), 
which may be used to pay or to receive payments from other companies within the circuit. 
Each company’s balance can therefore be either negative or positive. There are limits set on 
the budgetary imbalances of each company, which means they are charged not only for 
negative balances, but, symmetrically, also for positive ones. The companies may use their 
positive balances to remunerate their employees, thus fostering the local monetary circuit, 
which consists of two sub-circuits: in the first one, companies transfer a part of their assets in 
local currency to their employees as a supplementary remuneration. The employees have e-
purses at their disposal, thus allowing them to use the local currency in transactions with 
other participating companies. If a citizen-employee does not spend all of his or her local 
currency, a part of the remaining balance is periodically transferred to a non-profit 
organisation chosen by this individual from among those participating in the circuit.  
Thus, the local currency then enters the second sub-circuit, in which the non-profit 
organisations, which are also equipped with specific e-purses, spend the amounts they have 
received (see fig. 3). This type of monetary circulation especially helps to attenuate 
the paradoxical situation, characteristic for periods of crisis, in which unsold goods and 










Fig. 3. The Libra circuit 
 
Source: Amato. and Fantacci (2012b, 162). 
 
Thus a local finance system is created capable of producing a set of benefits for 
the community. The credit granted in the local currency is completely transformed into local 
demand. To the individual categories of involved subjects, such a system would offer a low 
cost form of financing, an instrument for bargaining, and supplementary way of remunerating 
labour as well as a source of financing for the third sector to meet the growing needs of social 
services. Non-profit organisations are actually entities that are structurally in deficit, because 
they are characterised by higher costs than revenues. The Libra circuit offers them a financing 
channel that may supplement or replace traditional methods by increasing the delivery level 
of social services or by relieving the pressure on public budgets, thus promoting planning by 
reducing high levels of uncertainty and, presumably, generating broader participation. 
The implementation of such a system thus has an explicit and wide-ranging political value, 
one in keeping with the spirit of subsidiarity and mutuality. Cooperation in a local economic 
zone can be reinvented in an unprecedented way, such that it would liberate the relationship 
between the free market and decisions regarding social policies from profitability pressures. 
Moreover, the cost reductions involved in financing the working capital coupled with 
an increase in demand – which in this scheme may potentially meet the new needs of 
the world of non-profit organisations – could also allow companies and the public 
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administration to increase their volume of long-term investments in euro, if they could count 
on better financial resources and expect increasing returns. A growth in qualified investments, 
given the appropriate productive specialisation of a local economic system, may stimulate 
aggregate demand and local income.12 The adoption of a local currency stimulates income, 
and the surplus may be distributed among companies and workers via plant-level bargaining. 
Public administrations, on the other hand, could further benefit from the existence of 
a clearing house as participants, since a clearing house functions as a low-cost creditor. 
This opens the way to fund public projects – so often barred by all the various financial 
restrictions characterising austerity policies – avoid the delays in payments to suppliers that 
weigh heavily on local economies and that, ultimately, reduce the use of costlier and riskier 
financial instruments, such as derivatives. In short, this institutional structure may efficiently 
bring out old and new spaces of mediation, i.e. old and new forms of democratic 
confrontation. The same criterion of crediting non-profit organisations can open a space for 
discussion and mediation for all those who care for collective needs.13  
Given the highly defined nature of the project, we might presage the creation of real 
“political technologies”: this expression is used to indicate processes of transformation and 
the structure that enables a consolidation of political debate, in this case an alternative 
monetary circuit. The integration of the local financial system in Nantes was introduced as 
a new social contract between the public and the private, business and workers, the world of 
production and the world of associations. It was launched at a time when economic tensions 
threatened to compromise social cohesion.14 The cooperation between the Italian founders of 
the project and the local institutions nonetheless failed at the threshold of the operational 
phase. The operational phase of SoNantes, on the other hand, has been delayed several 
times.15 To date, despite SoNantes being a part of the pilot currencies of the CCIA European 
Interregional Project,16 the complex nature of this political experiment has resulted in 
an extremely slow working out of agreements between the parties involved: the Crédit 
                                               
12 On this matter may the reader permit me to refer to Lucarelli and Romano (2016). 
13 It is not out of  the question that non-profit associations could be replaced by a municipal fund for social 
services. The urban precariat could thus reclaim a territory for direct representation.  
14 See e.g. La Monnaie Eutopique, 15 December 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KJnk-Z2_tY 
15 On the reasons for the continuous delays see the speech by Massimo Amato at the conference which 
took place in Macao, Milan 21 June 2014: http://quaderni.sanprecario.info/2014/07/convegno-moneta-del-
comune-introduzione-di-massimo-amato/. 
16 Community Currencies in Action, see http://community-currency.info/en/currencies/sonantes/. 
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Municipal de Nantes, the local Chamber of Commerce, the City of Nantes and the inter-
municipal metropolitan structure. The project looks like a top-down procedure whose 
outcomes raises numerous doubts and whose strategies seem aimed at obtaining the biggest 
possible electoral support and are therefore guided by a principle of political calculation. 
In this case, democratic participation in the decision-making process, which is a linchpin of 
gaining trust in the complementary currency, seems to be “the great absentee”. 
 The focus on social needs as well as the awareness that the construction of 
a monetary circuit poses also the challenge of democratic participation, characterizes another 
interesting French experience: Sol Violette in Toulouse.17 The Toulouse experience – which, 
bear it in mind, is not a clearing union but an alternative monetary circuit – began in May of 
2011, when the city launched a six-month-long experiment. Since 2007, the Sol model had 
existed as a political objective and was promoted by a group of activists called “Reconsidérer 
la richess”, who based themselves on the thought of Patrick Viveret. In 1998, inspired by 
Beenz, an international loyalty system intertwined with e-commerce that functioned between 
1998 and 2001 (Fare 2011), Viveret conceived a loyalty system limited to the social economy 
and that works online. However, the project has left the web and, little by little, 
has transformed into a digital currency used in the context of social economy, the Sol. 
 Before Sol Violette, another experiment was performed in Toulouse that had failed: 
a digital currency that was introduced by a top-down procedure without adequate citizen 
participation. The project started working only after attention was turned not exclusively to 
the demand for a complementary currency as such, but also to the involvement of various 
entities that establish an alternative political, productive and social cooperation. 
At the beginning there were 30 companies of sustainable development operating in the field 
of social economics, three district representatives and 150 individuals. The initial emission 
amounted to 27000 Sols (27000 euro).18 To date the local authorities cover most of 
the operating costs: 80 per cent is financed by the Metropolitan government of Toulouse, 15 
per cent by private foundations and the rest by the participants. After paying the membership 
fee, members of the circuit can exchange their euros for Sol Violettes at local branches of 
                                               
17 http://www.sol-violette.fr/ 
18 In October 2013, there were 1600 individual users and 130 firms and associations. The total amount of  
Sols in circulation was 47918. See Bilan 2013 Sol Violette, 60, download from http://www.sol-violette.fr/sol-
violette/le-projet/documentation. At the end of  2017, 2327 citizens and 258 firms and associations used Sols. 
The total amount of  Sols in circulation was 54292. See Bilan 2017 Sol Violette, 4. 
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Crédit Municipal or Credito Cooperativo. The banknotes are accepted by the companies-
members of the circuit (in 2013 there were about 50 food companies) but they can also be 
spent on tickets for public transport and on other types of local and cultural services. A Local 
Committee (CLAS) organises the decision-making processes, convening the Conseil des 
Collèges, which represent stakeholders, General Assemblies and plenaries: regional institutions 
and their administrations, non-profit associations and their beneficiaries, social and solidarity-
based social structures and their users, organisations and/or producers focussed on long-term 
development and their clients, banking and non-bank financial institutions – they all gather in 
the Colleges where they adhere to collective and democratic method of discussion and 
participation that is attentive to gender representation. 
 
Fig. 4. Model of governance of Sol Violette in Toulouse 
 
Source: Bilan Sol Violette. Phase d’experimentation mai 2011 – décembre 2011, Tolosa, p. 15. 
[Statuts – Statutes, Charte – Charter, Formulaire d’agréments – approval forms, Collectivité – Collective, Prestataires 
– Recipients, Financeurs – Financers, Solistes – Adherents, Fondateurs – Founders, Equipe – Staff] 
 
This governance model is absolutely vital for the project’s success (see fig. 4).19 The case of 
Sol Violette is interesting mainly for three reasons:  
 a. it is a currency that cannot be accumulated (a demurrage à la Gesell is applied, i.e. 
a negative interest tax on Sols that are accumulated and not spent within a reasonable time); 
 b. cooperation pre-exists the monetary circuit, at least from the point of view of 
the adherence to a series of ethical and economic objectives and imperatives; 
                                               
19 The governance model is meticulously explained in Bilan Sol Violette. Phase d’experimentation mai 2011 
– décembre 2011, downloadable from: http://www.sol-violette.fr/sol-violette/le-projet/documentation. See 
also the movie: Sol Volette. L’éclosion d’une monnaie, http://vimeo.com/45862277. 
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 c. the currency serves also as a form of income distribution: there is a project which 
establishes a payment of 30 Sols per month to an unemployed association (120 families). 
The redistribution is done on a case-by-case basis. This spurious form of guaranteed 
minimum social income seems to invigorate the construction of the circuit. However, 
this circuit remains limited by a cautious, if not meagre, monetary emission. 
 
The currency is a social relation even before it is a technology, which means it is not socially 
neutral, but at least partially crystallizes social relations which work just like institutions. 
If this does not occur, even the best structure imaginable – for example the Libra circuit that 
inspired SoNantes – does not produce good results. And vice versa: even when the 
technology is suboptimal and the exchange instrument has a limited potential of diffusion – 
as in the Sol Violette case – there may emerge a stable institutional structure with a potential 
for improvement through confrontation and mediation between circuit members. It does not 
seem that an opposition arises against the official monetary circuit in any of these cases. 
We are rather dealing with a form of experimental democratic accountability, one that may 
evolve and take a different shape: in the Sardex case we see a possible path of development 
according to which the business vision tends to prevail in a way that brings back spaces of 
mediation between capital and labour. In the case of Sol Violette we see new institutional 
structures whose main goal is to meet unsatisfied social needs, but needs that are still 
determined by the choices of a local authority that guarantees the ongoing emission of 
the complementary currency. 
Some notes on crypto coins 
 
The crypto coin experience presents a far more complex set of problems than local 
complementary currencies. First of all, the coin experiments are explicitly motivated by 
dissent against the state. This dissent presents two paths that are characteristic of anarchism: 
the first gives rise to the political inclinations of Friedrich von Hayek (Hayek 2001), while 
the second evokes the anti-authoritarian socialism typical of the thought of Noam Chomsky, 
but also – with all due differences – of the thought of a fair-share of intellectuals who, 
starting out in the so-called Autonomia, have developed political categories that are now being 
put to work in the debate on municipality rights (see Lotringer and Marazzi 2007, Chignola 
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2012, Marella 2012, Negri 2012). The currencies competition analysed by Hayek is based on 
the idea that all monopolies, especially those on money emission, are uneconomical because 
they prevent the progressive reduction of costs guaranteed by competitiveness.  
I have come to the firm conclusion that a free economic system will not be able to 
function effectively, nor will it be possible to suppress its worst downsides or contain 
the continuous growth of administration, if a monopoly on money emission is not be 
taken away from the government itself. I consider this objective to be so vital that it 
would, I believe, be essential for a free people’s constitution to establish such 
a principle, with some sort of a special clause, such as: “Parliament will not sanction 
any law that violates any person’s right to have, buy, sell or lend lend, stipulate and 
enforce contracts, calculate and hold their balance sheets, in the preferred type of 
currency” (Hayek 1986, 523). 
I will not dwell here on the analytical weaknesses of Hayek’s arguments. Suffice it to say that 
the rhetoric on free banking that has accompanied banking deregulation has often translated 
into the formation of powerful oligopolies. The great technological and social innovation 
characterising crypto coins consists in the central position assumed by peer to peer: the emission 
of these instruments, which conventionally may be used as means of payment in online 
transactions, does not need any emitters. It enables the diffusion of purchasing power 
independent from any traditional form of control, because there is no bank behind it. 
It is something that even Hayek did not foresee and that shows above all the ability of 
the online exchanges to define a virtual territory which provides a contact after contact 
between more currencies, able to consolidate and strengthen extant social relations beyond 
state control. However, this does not mean that the system that begins to take shape presents 
the characteristics of an alternative to capitalism. The ghost of Hayek lurks! 
 We shall dwell, however, on some aspects of the technologies behind crypto coins. 
Let’s take the case of Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2009). As is known, the Bitcoin production is 
possible thanks to an algorithm: purchasing power is transmitted from one wallet to another 
with use of a wallet’s unique identification code. The exchange happens only when both 
wallet’s codes are recognised.20 Once the transaction is completed, the Bitcoin system has to 
confirm it. The verification process is called mining and is conducted by the users of 
                                               
20 Correctly, it was suggested to me to clarify that in theory one can send bitcoins to a never-before-used, 
but valid in crypto-graphical terms, address. Such funds are “burnt”. This is unlikely, however, as there is 
a checksum to prevent this situation. 
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the system themselves: they share their computer’s power, so that the mining process may be 
performed. Thus the legitimisation of the exchange fuses with the creation of a new 
purchasing power, because users who make themselves available to run algorithms that 
constitute the verification process receive a fraction of Bitcoin as a reward.21 The whole 
process of creation and exchange of these units of account has also to maintain a certain level 
of security, which is provided by blocks of information (blockchains) that prevent users from 
taking possession of other user’s wallets. It is a sort of a public ledger. Besides, the timestamp 
server helps to avoid the same Bitcoin being used in different online commercial operations. 
As opposed to other online payment systems, like credit cards or Paypal, which cannot 
function without a bank account or some other form of money deposit, Bitcoin does not 
force its users to deal with intermediaries, whose presence affect the total cost of 
a commercial operation. However, the transactional function does not exhaust 
the characteristics of this experience. The enormous diffusion of Bitcoin and to an even 
bigger extent the volatility of its value, depends on the fact that over time crypto coins have 
been perceived mostly as financial products. Yet, due to its construction, Bitcoin can only be 
deflationary in the long term. It exists within a finite range of possibilities, since its emission 
(mining) becomes more and more difficult because the computing power necessary for 
the calculations resolving the algorithms increases in parallel to the growth of the number of 
Bitcoin transactions. No one can raise the amount of Bitcoin beyond a numerical limit that 
can already be estimated. How will markets react when the Bitcoin becomes scarce? What will 
happen to those who have accumulated these assets for speculative motives? And what will 
happen to those who use it for mere transactional purposes? 
 However, in my opinion, the most appropriate question, is the following: is it 
possible to imagine a world where the rentiers who accumulated Bitcoins in view of holding 
gains would be crowded out by a real revolution to come: one in which an alternative 
monetary circuit that is immune to speculative logics and diffused in communities of 
increasingly autonomous individuals is capable of creating a new monetary thinking? 
 At least part of the hackers community that has developed this and other more or less 
similar projects did not perceive them either as instruments aimed to deprive governments of 
their power, as support for a competitive private market for different currencies (Jaromil 
2014) or as a speculative asset able to be harnessed to favour a redistribution of resources 
                                               
21 This mechanism has already been explained on many occasions, notably by Meggiato (2014). 
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controlled by few, or even less so as fraud or as a means to enforce the Deep Web.22 
“In the hacker mentality passion is more important than money. Social motivation is part of 
his job, the hacker works for the society” (Gruppo Equipo 2008). Hacker ethics is contrary to 
processes that are exclusive and introduced and modified by only a few. It is founded on 
an open-source ideology that is meant as a self-regulative process that all control. Hackers see 
themselves and behave as a horizontal community that quickly passes from the conceptual to 
the creative stage. Ideas are never imposed on others and all the attention is paid to 
the growth of the individuals to create space for the development of all and the development 
of parallel solutions (Himanen 2003) (see fig. 5). 
 




Source: Gruppo Equipo (2008, 9). 
[Open source – self-managed process advanced and modified by all. 
Vs.  
Closed process advanced and modified by few; 
Horizontal community, which quickly passes from ideation of the problem to the creative stage. 
Vs. 
Vertical community, bureaucracy which slows the process.] 
 
                                               
22 The value of  Bitcoin was highly affected, both positively and negatively, by the Silk Road, anonymous 
marketplace, an online commercial platform that used Bitcoin as means of  payment. It operated using hidden 
Tor services and was shut down by the FBI for the first time on 3 October 2013 and definitively on 6 
November 2014. 
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Given the logics that characterise at least a part of the hacker community, crypto coins, and 
Bitcoin in the first place, are not themselves objectives. Instead they are understood to be 
a work in progress, a symbol of protest for network neutrality. Crypto coins could then constitute 
a social experiment whose goal would be to construct a new constituent sovereignty. We are 
certainly in the realm of the possible, and we are also in a problematic environment that 
needs to take material form to avoid being confined to a merely virtual reality. There is no 
doubt that crypto coins have incited interest in the possibility of creating purchasing power 
through open-source software. What seems even more interesting is the fact that they represent 
the means to substitute the peer to peer philosophy by so-called speculative motive. The tendency 
to accumulate wealth seems somehow destined to legitimise precisely those social interactions 
that are propelled by a social imaginary (in the sense of Cornelius Castoriadis)23 and social 
behaviours that are deeply hostile towards the authoritarian processes imposed by 
financialisation. Yet, these potentialities cannot remain confined to the Internet, if what is 
aspired to is a real capability to create a political being able to participate in decisions related 




In the light of the above considerations, the institutional nature of money comes clearly to 
light. Like all institutions, money has to be understood, created and experienced as a complex 
set of relations able to withstand the weight of its own structure, able to survive, able to last. 
The longevity of a monetary circuit does not depend exclusively on mere issues of social or 
management engineering. Trust is decisive. Trust is a point of departure for dissolving one of 
the Gordian knots that has been recurring from the beginning of my essay, that of 
sovereignty.  
Monetary mediation provides a common area for taking decisions on the value of 
reality, thus allowing the management of debt and credit relations. According to André 
Orléan, money may become an instrument of accounts control as an anthropological 
                                               
23 On this point see Kavoulakos 2000 
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expression of an absolute desire.24 For money to materialise, the problem of peaceful 
coexistence has to be resolved in advance; also required is some kind of a founding act that 
would abolish all forms of violent expropriation. In other words, money acts as a form of 
sovereignty (Orléan 2006) – a form that does not necessarily coincide with the state form. 
 Alternative monetary circuits may be conceived in different ways and therefore used 
for different purposes. Complementary currencies based on the clearing principle appear 
better able to cope with change than other monetary systems. In other words, they are 
resilient, especially if they are able to create and ensure an environment conducive to 
constructive economic and social interaction with no imposition of top-down procedures 
(Lucarelli and Gobi 2016). Theoretically, they can represent mechanism of exodus or 
defection from the oppressive authority that forces subjects into the perverse dynamics of 
continuously growing indebtedness. This aspect, however, is not found in the above case 
studies: 
 
- the Sardex experience aims in this phase at valorising skills that have been developed 
over time through forms of consultancy in other Italian regions; 
- the SoNantes project seems to be a top-down procedure, the outcome of which raises 
numerous worries; 
- Sol Violette represents a set of new institutional structures whose main goal is to 
satisfy local social needs, but which are strictly dependent on local political authority. 
 
Crypto coins are virtual currency schemes that cannot be considered full forms of money. 
They are a digital representation of value. On the other hand, they can be promoted with the 
aim of explicitly hurting state’s monopoly on money emission. They can also be promoted 
and coordinated by a state government with a view to introducing a new balance of powers 
between different levels of authority (Lucarelli and Gobbi 2016). All in all, the results depend 
on the collective wisdom of the decision-makers controlling these processes. 
Laurent Baronian and Carlo Vercellone (2015) underscore that money that does not 
obey capitalist logics should above all be used to finance welfare services and guarantee 
                                               
24 Following René Girard’s perspective, violence is nothing if  not the signifier of  the absolute, the form and 
substance of  absolute desire. André Orléan considers money as a form of  violence (Fumagalli and Lucarelli 
2011). 
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universal access to those services, and thus used to foster a model of development based on 
knowledge and on production by the people for the people.  
Can such a process be imagined, starting from a form of coordination between 
the alternative monetary circuits already at work? It is a question that may be as well phrased 
as follows: how may the alternative monetary circuits enhance a reproduction of labour 
power that would not succumb to capitalist logics, and, more generally, to logics of 
expropriation? 
Can we imagine that the knowledge acquired from the world of crypto currencies merges 
with the lessons learned from the reviewed case studies on local monetary circuits could bear 
fruit in the form of creating technologies and skill sets more powerful than any speculative 
dynamics or political calculation?  
If we have an institution of significant magnitude able to remunerate adequately 
the productive relations underway in one’s place of residence, it may act in concert with 
the satisfaction of collective needs that currently remain unexpressed. 
 Experiments using crypto coins on the one hand – if interpreted through hacker ethics 
– and with clearing unions on the other – provided they embody a truly participatory model of 
governance – seem to place us on the brink of the future politics, whose problematics were 
hinted at by Luciano Ferrari Bravo in one of his last works. His reflection did not pertain to 
the common understood as a juridical principle (Negri 2010) (an expression I consider abused 
and that risks spreading confusion regarding these extremely important issues), but rather to 
federalism:  
the framework of post-Fordist production and society seems to be naturally 
predisposed to accept – for the globalized government’s own needs – the conceptual 
and institutional resources offered by a sufficiently broad concept in a spirit of 
federalism. […] But the metaphor of a network, of a circular interconnection of flows 
and processes, does not authorise envisioning a social space structured symmetrically 
and horizontally (i.e. devoid of any problems regarding the authorities) […]. 
The network does not extend along a two-dimensional plan, its cruxes are not 
equidistant nor equivalent. It rather shapes a general process of concentration of non-
centralized power. […] In the same sense a very general hypothesis could be formulated 
about neo-federalism or postmodern federalism as an institutional key for global 
system governance structures. […] However, viewed from a bottom-up perspective, it 
allows us to recognise a constraint (but also an opportunity) that already lurks on 
the horizon of a future politics, that is the constitutive connection between global and 
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local dimensions in the processes of identity formation and in the determination of 
the political agenda in the new century’s public sphere (Ferrari Bravo 2001, 122–123).  
On the other hand, when we talk about money, we are also talking about sovereignty, and 
when we talk about sovereignty, in play also is the capacity to govern that a collective is able 
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